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• Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) Program 
- 1 of 3 NASA Programs based at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) 
- Established to develop and use the complex equipment required to safely 
handle rockets and spacecraft during assembly, transport, and launch 
3 I SA I C. -"''l 
Mission: 
To prepare KSC to process and launch the 
next generation of rockets and spacecraft in 
support of NASA's exploration objectives by 
developing the necessary ground systems, 
infrastructure·, and operational approaches. 
SA/C. 
• RMA is the acronym for Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability 
Reliability (R) 
• The probability (likelihood) that a component or system will perform its intended 
function with no failures for a given period of time (mission time) when used under 
specific operating conditions (test environment or operating environment) 
Maintainability (M) 
• The probability a failed item will be restored or repaired to a specified condition 
within a given period of time 
- Availability (A) 
• The probability that a repairable system will perform its intended function at a given 
point in time or over a specified period of time when operated and maintained in a 
prescribed manner. Thus , availability is a function of reliability and maintainability 
• If "R" is enough, then no need for "M" and "A"; if "R" is not enough, then 
"R" and "M" is needed to make "A" 
f(R,M) =A SA/C. 4 I S .~ 'C . co tn 
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• To reduce lifecycle cost by: 
- Efficiently and effectively identifying limitations within a system that may cause a 
failure before the intended lifetime 
- Identify unreliable systems that may pose a safety or health hazard 
- Providing specific Reliability requirements for component procurement 
- To identify wasted efforts and hardware that were intended to improve Availability, 
but are providing little value 
• · To study, characterize, measure, and analyze the failure and repair of systems 
in order to: 
- Improve their operational use by increasing their design life 
- Eliminate or reduce the likelihood of failures and safety risks 
- Reduce downtime (maintenance), thereby increasing available operating time 
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• Ideally, the Reliability Engineering process looks like this: 
I 
IE- -- Success Space ---~>~ ---- Failure Space 
Start FFBD =Functional Flow Block Diagram 
RBDA= Reliability Block Diagram Analysis 
FMEA= Failure Mode & Effects Analysis 
FTA = Fault Tree Analysis 
PRA= Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
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• GSDO Program needs to deliver high launch probability 
- Lunar missions and beyond require multiple launches and payloads to achieve mission 
goals 
- Commercial, DoD, and NASA customers will desire high availability from Ground Systems 
for launch support 
- The cost of each launch "scrub" is severe 
• De-tanking vehicles, re-synchronizing orbits, rescheduling Range conflicts, resting crew, etc 
• If a GROUND SYSTEM causes this scrub (when the vehicle was otherwise "Available'~, then the 
community's penalty is even more severe 
• High Probability of Successful launch is needed; however, challenges were 
faced: 
- KSC Ground Systems delivered 88% probability of launch during Space Shuttle Program 
(SSP) 
- KSC Ground Systems Constellation Program (CxP) requirement was 99% probability of 
launch for the last 10 hours of launch countdown 
- GSDO Program requirement is 98% Inherent Launch Availability for any given launch 
countdown 
SA/C 
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• Risk Factors for GSDO: 
8 J SAIC.com 
• Risks for launch probability: 
- GSDO 
- Space Launch System (SLS)-
the Launch Vehicle 
- Orion Multi-Purpose Crewed 
Vehicle (MPCV) 
- Environments - Launch Weather 
(Wx), Abort Wx, Sea State 
Example of Probability of Architecture on Any Given Launch Attempt* 
*Does not necessarily represent actual risk probabilities. 
SA/C. 
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• Needed to put requirements in place to minimize risks to 
successful launch support 
- Only could control risks to Ground Systems .... 
design and upgrades 
- Allocated Availability requirements to 
Ground Systems 
• Inherent Launch Availability 
• Operational Availability* : ~~~ _.',~' •: 0 • ,.~ • .~::~.:vi;·¥~ ,;g~~:.,~t~ 
.·. . '. 
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*The Operational Availability requirement is not the classical Operational Availability (AJ calculation. It is allocated as 
Inherent Availability (AJ. From a system design point of view, the A1 is of more interest than A0 because spares and repair 
· capability involve resources and trade-offs external to the system design. s~ A /C. 
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• Reliability allocations made via improved Reliability Apportionment 
Method 
- Accounts for knowledge of Ground System performance, design, and 
use 
• Maintainability allocations made via an improved MIL-HDBK-417A 
method 
- Accounts for knowledge of Ground System design, fault isolation 
techniques, and maintenance design characteristics, i.e., accessibility 
on the pad ,_. 
MTTR, • 37/rs 
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• "Management reserve" is built into each RMA requirement allowing for 
room for growth in GSDO subsystems 
- Fraction of the overall requirement is 
unallocated 
- If the cost for an availability improvement 
in a subsystem design outweighs the 
benefit in increased GSDO launch 
availability, there is enough management 
reserve to leave the design as-is, in most 
cases 
• The RMA analyses are completed in parallel with the design and upgrade 
schedules 
- RMA analysis is a required product for design milestones (30/60/90 or 45/90) 
- RMA analyses are performed as requested to assist in trade studies 
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• Allocation is an iterative process 
- As designs are analyzed, allocations may need to be adjusted 
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Importance Measures 
13 S A IC.C011'1 SA/C 
• Example of component data using COTS software: 
PTC Windchill Quality Solutions (WQS) 
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• Analysis of components will sometimes include Wei bull analysis to 
attempt to determine what type of failures are experienced 
- Used for similar components 
- Used for heritage subsystems to characterize failure types seen: 
• Early failures (burn-in) 
• Useful Life (random failures) 
• Wearout 
. - - -,_ 
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The Bathtub Curve 
~ SAIC All rights reserved 
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• Reliabili~y Block Diagram (RBD) Analysis (RBDA): 
- Predicts reliability (uptime), maintainability (downtime), and availability 
(mission readiness being a function of uptime and downtime) 
- The RBDA method is used to estimate and analyze the reliability and 
availability for the systems containing at least two or more elements 
• RBDA is a "top-down" method in success space 
• Analyzes Reliability (and Availability) relationships 
- Quantitative 
2::3 
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• RMA Team converts each drawing (mechanical and electrical) into a 
Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) 
- Verify accuracy and understanding of the components and their connections 
with the design team 
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• RMA team determines the RMA of the subsystem by using both analytical and 
Monte-Carlo simulation calculations with at least 1,000,000 iterations. 
- Confidence Level set at 95% 
• Compare results to requirement 
RMA Reguirements 
Reliability Maintainability Availability 
(for24 hrs) (hrs) <A.ntJ 
0.99900 48 0.998017 
Simulation Results 
Reliability Maintainability 
(for24 hrs) (hrs) 
0.998448 12.59 
• Perform sensitivity analysis to verify consistency in simulations 
- Different random number seeds for Monte-Carlo simulations 
Reliability Availability 
Random Failures per MTTR 
Point Upper 
Availability 
<Atm> 
0.999529 
Upper 
Seed Lower Bound Million (hrs) Lower Bound Point Estimate 
Estimate Bound Bound 
1 0.998564 0.998636 0.998708 54.07 12.59 0.999521 0.999562 0.999603 
10 0.998448 0 .998523 0.998598 67.10 12.61 0.999439 0.999484 0.999529 
100 0.998557 0.998630 0.998703 58.08 12.63 0.999520 0.999561 0.999602 
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• RMA Team performs Cut Set Analysis (CSA) 
- Set of basic events [failures] where the joint occurrence of these basic events results in 
the failure of the system. 
• Minimal cut set is a set that "cannot be reduced without losing its status as a cut set" 
- Provides clear indication of where most likely failure paths would be depending on the 
accuracy of the RBD and the accuracy of the failure data of the components 
Cut Set 
., Minimal Cut Set 
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• When a small number of failure paths make such large contributions to 
subsystem unavailability, isolating the key failure paths becomes obvious 
• This enables the design team to focus 
on either: 
- Improving the design to correct the high 
failure nodes (improving reliability), or 
Ensuring that the component is able to 
be repaired to an operational state as 
quickly as possible (improving maintainability) 
' .C. 
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• ExamQie of Cut Set Data 
CUM UNAVAIL% UNAVAIL% UNA VAIL Component Failure Component Failure 
5.92% 5.9~% "' ' 0.000146 ICPSU Position Encoder 1 
11.83% 5.92% 0.0001.46 ICPSU Position Encoder 3 
1..30% 3.22E-05 4000 PSI Hydraulic Supply Pressure 1.3.13% Xducer (36583MT-1.) 
1..08% 2.68E-05 2200 PSI GN2 Supply Valve 1.4.22% C36583A1.2) 
1.5.1.7% 0.95% 2.36E-05 Fully Extend Switch (36596) 
1.5.97% 0.80% 1..97E-05 Slow Extend/Retrack Valve (36583A9) 
1.6.67% 0.70% 1.. 727 42E-05 CB CGSP to RIO) 50A -Side A CB CGSP to RIO) 50A- Side B 
1.7.37% 0.70% 1.. 727 42E-05 CB (GSP to RIO) 50A- Side A Circuit Breaker (CB) 2A -Side B 
1.8.07% 0.70% 1. 727 42E-05 CB CGSP to RIO) 50A- Side A Circuit Breaker CCB) to TB- Side B 
1.8.77% 0.70% 1. 727 42E-05 CB (GSP to RIO) 50A- Side A Circuit Breaker to Chassis- Side B 
Circuit Breaker to lnd & Enable-1.9.47% 0.70% 1. 727 42E-05 CB CGSP to RIO) 50A- Side A SideB 
20.17% 0.70% 1.. 727 42E-05 Circuit Breaker CCB) 2A- Side A CB CGSP to RIO) 50A- Side B 
20.87% 0.70% 1.. 727 42E-05 Circuit Breaker CCB) 2A - Side A Circuit Breaker CCB) 2A- Side B 
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• GSDO RMA Team performs Importance Measure Analysis (IMA) 
- Assesses the importance of the components in the subsystem or the sensitivity of the subsystem 
RMA to changes in the components' failure rates 
- Quantifv the criticality of a particular component within a system design. 
- Used as tool for identifying system weakness, and to prioritize RMA improvement activities 
- Change in the failure rates of the components (or adding redundancy to account for the high failure 
rate) with the highest importance measure percent contribution will have the most significant effect 
on increasing subsystem reliability 
• This unique method described in paper written by RMA team, entitled, "Comparison 
Modeling of System Reliability for Future NASA projects" and presented at International 
Reliability and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS) in January 2012 Ensure this componenVLRU 
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Is on hand In order to repair 
and/or replace when failed. 
Ensure personnel are trained 
In procedures for repair 
and/or replace. 
3. Ensure procedures are 
optimized for repair and/or 
replace. 
• GSDO RMA Team reports results and recommendations in Subsystem 
RMA reports 
Example recommendations for RMA improvement: 
• Have redundant components on separate busses 
-- Improved availability by an order of magnitude (0.995 to 0.9994) 
• Move control and monitoring to different Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) 
-- Had redundant monitoring on same PLC (see next page) 
-- Improved availability by three orders of magnitude (0.9993 to 0.999999) 
Example recommendations for trades: 
• Tertiary power system provides little to no 
improvement in availability (0.999995 to 
0.999996); does not justify additional 
weight, space, and cost 
• Avionics architectures: triplex voter 
improves availability, however, self-checking 
pair does not 
23 I 2 A. I c . c 0 ~ 
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• Effectively monitoring and tracking RMA analysis results for 
management 
- Management informed of risk to achieving requirements almost immediately 
• RMA tracking & reporting methodology effective and efficient in 
communicating recommendations for RMA improvements 
- Can quantify RMA improvements versus cost, scheduling, weight, space 
impacts 
A,... Allocations •nd Results Allocations October 2012 Results 
25 I 3 D. 1 C . c o rn SA/C. 
COl SAIC. All rights reserved. 
• GSDO requirements allocated to subsystems 
- Inherent Launch Availability is allocated to those subsystems in the launch 
countdown window 
- Operational Availability is allocated to those subsystems not included in the 
Inherent Launch Availability allocation, but needed in the event of a launch 
scrub 
• GSDO RMA team performing RMA analysis of subsystem designs and 
upgrades, as well as heritage subsystems 
- Analysis of heritage subsystems includes Wei bull analysis to attempt to 
determine what type of failures experienced: Early failures (burn-in), Useful Life 
(random failures), Wearout 
• GSDO is tracking and reporting RMA analysis results of ground hardware 
and software components 
• FTA, FMEA, etc are performe~ as part of the design development cycle to 
drive out subsystem hazards and single failure points 
SA/C. 
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• Failure Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
• Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
• Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
• Historical Component Failure Rate Determination 
• Component Burn-in and Test Time Requirements 
27 I SAIC .co1n SA/C 
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• Inductive (bottom-up) method where a table that describes the way or modes in which each 
system component can fail and assess the consequences of each of these failures is 
generated 
• Determines hardware criticality 
• Identifies failure modes that do not meet applicable Program reliability requirements 
• Identifies the potential for single point failures 
• Identifies areas where the design does not meet the failure tolerance requirements 
• Changed from qualitative to quantitative by assigning values to: 
1. Probability of the failure occurring, 
2. Severity of the effect of the failure on 
the operation of the systems, 
3 . Probability that the system controls will 
detect and eliminate the failure before the 
design is complete. 
- The product of all three values is the risk 
priority number (rpn) 
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Description 
~ 
Wry lpw or None· 
low or Minor 
l 
. Moderate or 
.Signific~nt 
High 
· very. ~·uitt. or 
. C~tastrophic 
Criteria 
Minor nuisance 
Product operable at 
reduced performance 
·Gradual performance 
degradation 
loss of function 
SafetY~related 
catastrophic failures 
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• Deductive (top-down)' method that generates a symbolic logic model that traces 
and analyzes the failure paths from a predetermined, undesirable condition or 
event (called the top event) of a system to the failures or faults 
• Can be qualitative or quantitative - we do quantitative 
• FTA is an event-oriented analysis in contrast to the RBD, which is a structural-
oriented analysis 
29 I SA IC.con SA/C. 
• Systematic and comprehensive methodology to evaluate risks associated with a 
complex system 
• Risk in PRA is defined as scenarios, associated frequencies, and associated 
consequences 
- Risk management involves prevention of adverse scenarios and promotion of favorable 
scenarios 
- NASA uses Risk metrics of probability of loss of vehicle, mission failure, etc 
• Goal is to describe how the system and its elements respond to an undesired 
initiating event, such as lightening or fire 
• Quantitative 
- Magnitude of the possible adverse consequence 
- Probability of the occurrence of each consequence 
• Include: 
- Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) 
- Common-Cause-Failure Analysis (CCF) 
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• Using 442 PRACA records: 
- Input into Weibull Analysis 
(:) SAIC. A! I rights reserved. 
- Results: 
• It is in its useful life cycle, with 
random failures 
• ~=1.0615 
• MTBF = 2991 hrs 
- Assumptions 
• Repair Time: 223 hrs 
• Inspection Time: 8 hrs 
Maintainability 
Maximum Availability = 87% 
• Inspection Time= 220 hrs 
SA/C. 
• RMA Analysis can determine product testing parameters 
- Reliability life testing can quantify reliability or safety goals 
- Burn-in test times can determine constant failure rates 
- Can determine acceptance test parameters 
• The Weibull shape parameter (p) corresponds to the different failure modes for 
components 
-- Infant mortality when p is less than 1 
- Random defects when p is equal to.1 
- Wear-out when p is greater than 1 
• The results of System Reliability 
analysis can be misleading if 
components are not properly 
up-screened (burned-in) or used 
under a certain bias condition 
where different failure modes may 
occur 
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• RMA Analysis provides quantitative results, which can be used to justify 
component replacement, system upgrades, cost effectiveness of "abandon 
in place" concepts for systems, etc 
• GSDO RMA process allows for verification and traceability of RMA 
requirements 
• GSDO RMA Analysis encompasses entire design life cycle 
- RBDA - FTA 
- FMEA - PRA 
• RMA Analysis can be used to optimize timeline and launch availability 
results 
- Provide MTBF, failure distribution, MTTR, and repair probability to Ground 
System hardware and software 
• RMA Analysis can be used to optimize Logistics considerations 
- Spare parts need - Preventative Maintenance requirements 
- Logistic Facility space - Maintenance Personnel Requirements SAIC 34 I s,\iC . corr. 
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• GSDO RMA Team Papers Published: 
- ~~on Component Reliability and System-Reliability for Space Missions," IEEE International 
Reliability Physics Symposium (IRPS) 2012, Anaheim, CA, 2012 
- ~~comparison Modeling of System Reliability for Future NASA Projects," Reliability, 
Availability, and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS) 2012 Conference, Reno, NV, 2012. 
- ~~constellation Ground Systems Launch Availability Analysis: Enhancing Highly Reliable 
Launch Systems Design," American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) 
2010-2180, SpaceOps 2010 Conference, Huntsville, Alabama, 2010. 
• Future Papers for Reliability and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS) 2013 
(January 2013 in Orlando, FL): 
- "Allocating Reliability & Maintainability Goals to NASA Ground Systems" 
• Paper described GSDO RMA Allocation process for GSDO 
- "Determining Component Probability from Problem Report Data Used in Ground Systems 
for Manned Space Flight" 
• Describes process of capturing qualitative PRACA failure data for use to determine quantitative 
component reliabilities 
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